The natural preference domain for many practical settings of the assignment problems is the one in which agents are allowed to be indifferent between objects, the weak preference domain. Most of the existing work on assignment problems assumes strict preferences. There are important exceptions, but they provide solutions only to the assignment problems with a social endowment, where agents own objects collectively and there are no private endowments. We consider the general class of assignment problems with private endowments and a social endowment. Our main contribution is a recursive solution for the weak preference domain. Our solution satisfies individual rationality, ordinal efficiency and a recently introduced fairness axiom, no justified-envy.
Introduction
We consider the assignment problem: a set of objects has to be allocated to a group of agents in such a way that each agent receives at most one object and monetary transfers between the agents are not permitted. Examples include the assignment of campus housing to students, jobs to workers, rooms to housemates, and offices to professors. For convenience, this paper uses language that fits the first example and refers to the objects as houses.
A prominent feature of many real-life assignment problems is the presence of agents with private endowments: some agents (existing tenants) own their own houses, whereas others (new applicants) do not, and the houses not owned by the existing tenants are the social endowment. This assignment problem is the focus of the current paper and we refer to it as an assignment problem with private endowments and a social endowment. Our goal is to propose an efficient and fair solution defined on the preference domain with indifference permitted, the weak preference domain.
In assignment problems with a social endowment, agents own houses collectively. In this class of problems, fairness is essential and to restore ex ante fairness, a lottery mechanism is commonly used in real-life applications: An ordering of agents is randomly drawn from the uniform distribution. For a given ordering, the first agent is assigned the top house in his announced ranking, then the second agent is assigned the top house in his announced ranking of the remaining houses, and so on. This is the random priority (RP) solution. 1 The RP solution is strategy-proof, ex-post efficient; it treats equals equally. However, it does not satisfy ordinal efficiency, an efficiency requirement for ordinal mechanisms where only individual preferences over sure houses are elicited. 2, 3 Another class of solutions is induced by the parametric family of eating algorithms (Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)): 4 Each house is imagined as being infinitely divisible. There is one unit of each house. A quantity of house h, given to agent i, represents the probability with which agent i is assigned house h. For each agent, an 'eating' speed is specified. At any time, each agent eats the top available house in his announced ranking at the specified speed:
if the houses a, b, c, . . . have been entirely eaten (one unit of each has been distributed), and houses x, y, z, . . . have not, each agent starts eating the top house in his announced ranking of x, y, z, . . . This class contains a special solution, the probabilistic serial (PS) solution, which 1 The RP solution is equivalent to the 'core from random endowment' solution, a solution that randomly chooses an endowment profile and then selects the core of the induced assignment problem with private endowments. (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998)) 2 For ordinal efficiency and its analysis, see Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) , Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) , and McLennan (2002) .
3 This implies that, when agents are equipped with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over random allocations (lotteries over assignments of houses), the RP solution is not ex-ante efficient. A related result is by Zhou (1990) : there is no lottery mechanism that is ex-ante efficient, anonymous, and strategy-proof. 4 See also Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2002) and Crés and Moulin (2001) .
requires agents' eating speeds to be the same. The PS solution improves on the RP solution in terms of efficiency and fairness: it is ordinally efficient and envy-free. The weakness of the PS solution is that it does not satisfy strategy-proofness.
In assignment problems with private endowments and a social endowment, an indispensable property is individual rationality: each existing tenant finds his assignment at least as desirable as his endowment. When there is no social endowment, a well-known individually rational solution is the top trading cycles (TTC) solution: Each house points to its owner; each agent points to his top available house in his announced ranking. Since the number of agents is finite, there is at least one cycle. Each agent in each cycle is assigned the house to which he points. The agents in all cycles are removed with their assigned houses. The procedure is repeated until each agent receives a house. This solution is characterized by individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness (Ma (1994) , Svensson (1999) ). It is generalized to the TTC solution from random orderings, which reduces to the RP solution when there are no private endowments, and to the TTC solution when there is no social endowment (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1999) ). 5 The TTC solution from random orderings is individually rational, ex-post efficient and strategy-proof. 6 Also, the eating algorithm is generalized for the assignment problems with private endowments and a social endowment (Yılmaz (2006) ). The induced solution, the individually rational probabilistic serial ( PS IR ) solution satisfies individual rationality, ordinal efficiency and a recently introduced fairness axiom, no justified-envy. 7 This last axiom is important: when there are private endowments, individual rationality and no envy (the central notion of fairness) are incompatible; by weakening no envy so that it is compatible with individual rationality, no justified-envy is the key in interpreting the fairness aspects of an assignment.
The solutions discussed so far are defined on the strict preference domain, which is fairly restrictive in many practical settings. 8 While most of the existing work assumes strict preferences, there are important exceptions. A deterministic solution on the weak preference domain is the serially dictatorial solution and it satisfies efficiency, neutrality and strategyproofness (Svensson (1994) ). Another deterministic solution, the bi-polar serially dictatorial solution generalizes the serially dictatorial solution and it is characterized by strategy-5 Also, Pápai (2000) introduced hierarchical exchange rules, which generalize the TTC solution and includes the TTC solution from random orderings as a special class. 6 Recently, Sönmez andÜnver (2005) generalized the main result in Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1998) : First, construct an endowment structure by assigning each existing tenant his own house and randomly assigning the vacant houses to new applicants with uniform distribution. The core based mechanism chooses the core allocation of the induced housing market. The core based mechanism is equivalent to an extreme case of the TTC mechanism where new applicants are randomly ordered first and existing tenants are randomly ordered next.
proofness, non-bossiness, essential single-valuedness and Pareto indifference (Bogomolnaia et al. (2005) ). These fixed priority solutions, however, do not satisfy even the weakest fairness axiom. Clearly, fairness considerations lead to randomization. To discuss the random solutions, we first consider a special case of the weak preferences, the case of dichotomous preferences, where each agent views the houses as either acceptable or unacceptable. A well-known result from graph theory, the Gallai (1963 , 1964 )-Edmonds (1965 Decomposition Lemma, characterizes the set of efficient assignments in the dichotomous domain. The egalitarian solution (Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) ) finds an efficient random assignment that equalizes the agents' probabilities of being assigned to an acceptable house as much as possible in the sense of Lorenz Dominance. The other random solution is the extended probabilistic serial (EPS) solution, which extends the PS solution for the weak preference domain (Katta and Sethuraman (2006) ). The EPS solution is equivalent to the egalitarian solution in the dichotomous domain. While these solutions extend the existing solutions to the assignment problem with a social endowment for the weak preference domain, there is no solution to the assignment problem with private endowments and a social endowment on the weak preference domain.
Our contribution is to construct a recursive solution to the assignment problem with private endowments and a social endowment, which is defined on the weak preference domain.
The algorithm presented here is a natural extension of the algorithm due to Katta and Sethuraman (2006) for this more general problem; we exploit the graph-theoretical results, and the tools and techniques from network flow theory that they use. Our solution satisfies individual rationality, ordinal efficiency and no justified-envy. 9
The model
A non-empty finite set of houses H has to be allocated to a non-empty finite set of agents I in such a way that each agent receives at most one house. Being unassigned to any of the houses in H is denoted by h 0 .
An endowment profile is a function µ 0 : I → H ∪ {h 0 } such that µ 0 (i) = µ 0 (j) implies µ 0 (i) = h 0 . Let M 0 denote the set of all endowment profiles. Given an endowment profile Each agent i has a transitive and complete (but not necessarily strict) preference relation R i on H. We denote this domain of preferences by D. Each agent prefers each house to h 0 and also, |I| = |H| . 10 Let R = (R i ) i∈I be a preference profile. Also, for each S ⊆ I, let
An assignment problem with private endowments and a social endowment, or simply a problem, is a quadruple (I, H, µ 0 , R). Since the sets I and H are fixed throughout the paper, we use (µ 0 , R) instead of (I, H, µ 0 , R) to denote a problem.
A deterministic assignment is a bijection µ from I into H; it is represented as a permutation matrix, that is, a |I| × |H| matrix with entries 0 or 1, and exactly one nonzero entry per row and one per column. Let M denote the set of all deterministic assignments.
We extend the preference of agent i to the set of deterministic assignments in the following natural way: Agent i prefers µ to µ if and only if he prefers µ(i) to µ (i). A deterministic assignment is Pareto efficient if no other deterministic assignment makes each agent at least as well off and at least one agent better off. It is individually rational if each existing tenant finds his assignment at least as desirable as his endowment.
A random consumption is a probability distribution over H. Let H denote the set of all random consumptions. A lottery is a probability distribution over deterministic assignments. Let M denote the set of all lotteries. Each lottery induces a random assignment Q = [q ih ] i∈I,h∈H , where q ih ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that agent i receives house h. Let Q i denote the resulting random consumption for agent i. A random assignment is represented as a bistochastic matrix. Let Q denote the set of all random assignments. A solution is a
Given i ∈ I, R i ∈ D, and a pair of random consumptions Q i and T i , Q i stochastically
Given a pair of distinct random assignments Q, and T, Q stochastically dominates T, if and only if, for each i ∈ I, Q i stochastically dominates T i . A random assignment is ordinally efficient if and only if it is not stochastically dominated by any other random 10 These assumptions are without loss of generality.
assignment.
A solution is individually rational, if for each agent, the support of his random consumption is contained in the upper contour set of his preferences at his endowment. A solution is ordinally efficient if it always selects ordinally efficient random assignments.
A solution is strategy-proof if truth-telling is a dominant strategy in its associated
A new solution on the weak preference domain
The PS solution is defined only for the strict preferences. It is extended to the weak preference domain by using tools and techniques from network flow theory (Katta and Sethuraman (2006) ): A parametric network (we define it in the next sub-section) is constructed, in which each agent points to his best available houses. However, when there are private endowments, the associated solution is not individually rational. By using network flow theory, we introduce a new solution, which satisfies individual rationality. A flow in (G, k, s, t) is a function f : A → + , satisfying the following properties:
Flows and cuts: Preliminaries
The value of f, denoted by v(f ) is defined by
Let G = (N, A) be a digraph and (G, k, s, t) be a network. Given a set of nodes N 1 ⊆ N,
The s − t cut determined by the separator N is the set of arcs A(N ∪ {s}). The capacity of an s − t cut determined by N is the sum of the capacities of all the arcs in A(N ∪ {s}); it is denoted by k(N ).
The maximum value of any flow cannot be more than the capacity of any s − t cut;
thanks to the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem (Ford and Fulkerson (1956) ), we have a better understanding of the maximum value of the flows.
Theorem 1 (Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem) Let (G, k, s, t) be a network. The maximum value of any flow equals the minimum capacity of any s − t cut.
The straightforward implication of this result is that, to show that a flow is optimal, it is enough to find an s − t cut in the network with the same capacity as the value of the flow.
The generalized probabilistic serial (GPS) solution: algorithm and its analysis
We introduce a new solution, the generalized probabilistic serial (GPS) solution. The GPS solution is induced by our algorithm which is based on a recursive application of the parametric maximum flow algorithm; at each step, the algorithm assigns the agents equal amounts of their favorite available houses, as long as there is an assignment of the remainders of the houses such that the resulting assignment is individually rational. At some point, it could be that if each agent is assigned a positive amount, the remainders of the houses are not enough to guarantee the individual rationality (IR) for at least one of the existing tenants.
At this point, IR dictates that the remainders of some houses should be assigned to a set of existing tenants. These houses and agents constitute a bottleneck set, and they induce a sub-problem, in which the same algorithm so far is applied recursively. Before we define the GPS solution, we illustrate how to apply the parametric maximum flow algorithm to capture the IR constraints. Let (µ 0 , (R i ) i∈I ) be a problem.
Step 
Agents 1 and 2 are the existing tenants. Thus, the set of replica tenants is { 1, 2} and the associated λ−parametric network is shown in Figure 1 . We study the minimum capacity s − t cuts as λ varies. H) ) .
Since there is no arc directed from I 1 ∪ I 2 to node h, the capacity of the s − t cut determined by the separator
This contradicts that the separator I 1 ∪ I 2 ∪ H determines a minimum capacity s − t cut. Thus,
Suppose I 2 is non-empty and there is an agent i in I 2 \ I 1 . Since
the capacity of the s − t cut determined by the separator
Thus, the separator
The capacity of the s − t cut determined by a separator S = I 1 ∪ I
Also, the capacity of the s − t cut determined by the separator ∅ is
Note that, since each house is occupied by at most one agent, |U I 2 | ≥ I 2 . Thus, k(S)(0) ≥ k(∅)(0). This holds with equality only if |U I 2 | = I 2 . In this case, individual rationality implies that the houses in U I 2 have to be allocated only to the agents in I 2 .
Suppose, for each nonempty separator S, k(S)(0) > k(∅)(0). Thus,
For λ close enough to zero, the empty set is the unique separator that determines the minimum capacity s − t cut. Both k(S) and k(∅) are linear functions of λ, and since I 1 ⊇ I 2 , k(∅)(λ)
is at least as steep as k(S)(λ).
Let S = I 1 ∪ I 2 ∪ (U I 2 T op(R I 1 , H)) I ∪ I E ∪ H be a nonempty separator such that k(S) crosses k(∅) first:
We call S a bottleneck set. 11 To see why S is a bottleneck set, let λ * be such that k(S)(λ * ) = k(∅)(λ * ). We call λ * the break point. For λ < λ * , the empty set uniquely determines the minimum capacity s − t cut. At λ * , both S and the empty set determine a minimum capacity s − t cut. Then, the maximum flow in λ * − network is λ * |I N | + |I E | . Since it is equal to the sum of the capacities of the arcs in A s→I∪ I E , the flow of each arc in A s→I is λ * and of each arc in A s→ I E is 1 − λ * . There exists ε > 0 such that in the (λ * + ε) − network, k(S)(λ * +ε) < k(∅)(λ * +ε). Thus, at λ * +ε, the maximum flow is less than (λ * +ε) |I N |+|I E | .
Then, in any maximum flow f, the flow of at least one of the arcs in A s→I∪ I E is less than problem with the agents in I 1 , the replica tenants in I 2 and the houses in U I 2 T op (R I 1 , H) .
The GPS solution. Each agent i is connected to his favorite available houses, and each replica tenant j is connected to the available houses in U j . The capacity of each of these arcs is infinity. Each available house is connected to the sink node through an arc of unit capacity.
The capacity of each arc from node s to an agent will be specified at each step during the algorithm.
Step 1: Initialization.
Let m = 0, I 0 = I, I 0
Step 2: Network construction.
Construct the network as follows: (iv) each house in H m is connected to node t through an arc with capacity 1.
Step 3: Identifying the bottleneck.
Solve the corresponding parametric max-flow problem. Let λ * m be the break point. 
(v) if H m+1 = ∅, then increase m by 1 and go to step 2. Otherwise, terminate the algorithm.
allocate the houses in H to the agents in I 1 via the Sub-algorithm S.
Sub-algorithm S : Let I 0 = I 1 , I 0 E = I 2 , H 0 = H . For each i ∈ I 0 , let k 0 (s, i) = k m (s, i) + λ * m , and for each i ∈ I 0 E , let k 0 (s, i) = k m (s, i). The algorithm is applied from step 2 onwards, except that while each agent i ∈ I 0 E is connected to node s through an arc with capacity k 0 (s, i) + λ, each agent i ∈ I 0 \ I 0 E is connected to node s through an arc with capacity k 0 (s, i); this capacity is fixed and is not parametric throughout the sub-algorithm. 12 (iv) Remove the houses and agents as follows:
The properties of the GPS solution
In each step of the GPS solution, each existing tenant i and his replica i never point to a house that is worse than µ 0 (i) for agent i. Also, if an existing tenant belongs to a bottleneck set whereas his replica does not, and the bottleneck set involves a nonempty set of replica tenants, then the capacity of the arc from node s to this existing tenant is not parametric in the sub-algorithm of this bottleneck. Moreover, throughout the algorithm, the total flow that goes through the node of existing tenant i and his replica i is equal to 1. Also, in each sub-algorithm corresponding to a bottleneck set involving replica tenant i, there are two cases: either the break point is such the capacity (and the flow) of the arc connecting node s to replica tenant i is zero, or there is a bottleneck set. Applying the same argument to this bottleneck set, we conclude that the total amount assigned to replica tenant i is zero. Thus, the GPS solution is individually rational.
In the algorithm describing the GPS solution, each agent points to his favorite available houses. This is the intuition for ordinal efficiency of the GPS solution.
Proposition 1 The GPS solution is ordinally efficient.
In assignment problems with private endowments and a social endowment, individual rationality and no envy, the central concept of fairness, are incompatible. Recently, a new fairness notion, no justified-envy, is introduced (Yılmaz (2006)); it is weaker than no envy and compatible with individual rationality. It views an assignment as unfair if an agent does not prefer his consumption to another agent's consumption and the assignment obtained by swapping their consumptions respects the individual rationality requirement of the latter agent.
If a bottleneck set involves replica tenant i, then, at the given break point, each maximum flow is such that the total flow that goes through existing tenant i and his replica i is equal to 1. If there is a flow going through an agent, who is not in the bottleneck set and points to a house in the bottleneck set, then individual rationality is violated. Thus, an agent is assigned units from his favorite available houses, but only until this critical point is reached. This is the reason for the fairness of the GPS solution.
Proposition 2 The GPS solution satisfies no justified-envy.
The PS IR solution does not satisfy weak strategy-proofness (Yılmaz (2006) ). Since the GPS solution reduces to the PS IR solution on the strict preference domain, the GPS solution does not satisfy weak strategy-proofness neither. Also, individual rationality, no justified-envy, and strategy-proofness are incompatible (Yılmaz (2006) ).
Conclusion
We have constructed a recursive solution to the assignment problems with private endowments and a social endowment, the generalized probabilistic serial (GPS) solution; it is defined on the weak preference domain. The GPS solution satisfies individual rationality, ordinal efficiency and no justified-envy. The GPS solution extends the probabilistic serial (PS) solution in two dimensions: it is defined under weak preferences and it accounts for individual rationality requirement. It reduces to the PS IR solution on the strict preference domain, and to the EPS solution when there are no private endowments.
Appendix

The GPS solution: An example
Example 2 Consider the following preferences:
Step 1: We construct the network shown in Figure 2 . At λ 1 = 2 5 , the separator { 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} ∪ {h 1 , h 2 , h 3 } determines an s − t cut with capacity 21 5 . Since there is a flow of value 21 5 , it is a bottleneck set:
We proceed with the sub-algorithm to allocate houses {h 1 , h 2 , h 3 } to agents {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
Step 2: Sub-algorithm { 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} ∪ {h 1 , h 2 , h 3 }. The network is shown in Figure 3 . At λ 2 = 1 5 , the separator {1, 2} ∪ {h 1 } determines an s − t cut with capacity 3. Since there is a flow of value 3,
the set {1, 2} ∪ {h 1 } is bottleneck set, and house h 1 is allocated to agents 1 and 2; agent 1 is assigned 3 5 units, and agent 2 is assigned 2 5 units. Since the capacity of the arc (s, 2) is fixed at 2 5 , agent 2 is assigned 2 5 units and leaves. Step 3: Sub-algorithm { 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}∪{h 1 , h 2 , h 3 }. The network is shown in Figure 4 .
The break point is λ 3 = 2 5 . Agent 1 leaves and houses h 1 , h 2 , h 3 are allocated; the flows are follows: Step 4: We construct the network in Figure 5 . Step 5: Sub-algorithm { 2, 3, 2, 3, 4, 5} ∪ {h 4 , h 5 }. We construct the network in Figure 6 . Step 6: Agents 2 and 3 leave. The final network is shown in Figure 7 . 
Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We use the following characterization result:
Lemma 1 ( Katta and Sethuraman (2006) ) Given a preference profile R ∈ D and a random assignment Q, define a binary relation in H as follows:
The binary relation is strict if in the above expression h P i h . The relation τ (Q, R) is strictly cyclic if it is cyclic and at least one of the binary relations in the cycle is strict. 
with at least one of the binary relations in the cycle is strict, and for i = 1, ..., K − 1, GP S β(h i ),i+1 (R, µ 0 ) > 0 and GP S β(h K ),1 (R, µ 0 ) > 0.
Without loss of generality, assume that k * th binary relation is strict for some k * ∈ {1, ..., K} :
h k * P β(h k * ) h k * +1 . For each k ≤ K, let s k be the step of the algorithm that describes the GPS solution, during which h k is in the bottleneck set. Since for agent β(h k ), h k is at least as good as h k+1 , agent β(h k ) is assigned a positive amount of h k+1 , h k+1 could not have been in the bottleneck set before h k . Thus, s k ≤ s k+1 . Thus, s 1 ≤ s 2 ≤ . . . ≤ s K ≤ s 1 .
Thus, each house in {h 1 , . . . , h K } is allocated in the same step. Let S be a bottleneck set such that {h 1 , . . . , h K } ⊆ S. If S ∩ I E = ∅, then, since house h k * is available and agent β(h k * ) does not point to house h k * +1 , he is not assigned any parts of house h k * +1 . But it contradicts GP S β(h * k ),k * +1 (R, µ 0 ) > 0. Suppose S = I 1 ∪ I 2 ∪ H 1 , where I 2 = ∅. If there is an agent β(h k ) ∈ I 1 , then, since, by definition of the algorithm, the houses in H 1 are allocated to the agents in I 1 , he is not assigned any parts of house h k+1 . But it contradicts GP S β(h k ),k+1 (R, µ 0 ) > 0. Thus, {β(h 1 ), β(h 2 ), . . . , β(h K )} ⊆ I 1 .
At the beginning of the sub-algorithm S, each house in H 1 is available. The same argument above applies here: Each house in {h 1 , . . . , h K } is allocated in the same step. Let S = I 1 ∪ I 2 ∪ H 1 be a bottleneck such that {h 1 , . . . , h K } ⊆ H 1 , and I 2 = ∅. Then, in the subsub-algorithm S , each house in {h 1 , . . . , h K } is allocated in the same step. Let S be a bottleneck. . . . But this contradicts the finiteness of the problem. Thus, the GPS solution is ordinally efficient.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Let (µ 0 , R) be a problem. Let i, j ∈ I. Let k(i) be the step at which agent i leaves. Suppose k(j) < k(i). Since the GPS solution allocates each house in U j in or before step k(j), and agent i is assigned positive amounts after k(j), the set Support(GPS i )\U j is nonempty. Thus, agent i does not envy agent j. Suppose k(j) > k(i). Let h ∈ U i . Let k be the first step in which each house in U (R i , h) is allocated. In the first k steps, agent i is assigned houses only from the set U (R i , h). Thus, the amount of the houses in U (R i , h), which are allocated to agent i, Thus,
q j,h . Thus, GPS i stochastically dominates GPS j at R i . Thus, agent i does not envy agent j. Suppose k(j) = k(i). Let S = I 1 ∪ I 2 ∪H 1 be the bottleneck at step k(i). Note that either I 2 = ∅ or i, j ∈ I 2 . If I 2 = ∅, the same argument in the case k(j) > k(i) applies. If i, j ∈ I 2 , all the arguments above apply recursively to the sub-algorithm S. Thus, the GPS solution satisfies no justified-envy.
